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INTRODUCTION
For those familiar with Japan, the simple mention of the 
Yasukuni Shrine raises the specter of controversy. The Shrine is 
an edifice of the Meiji Era that sprung from humble and innocent 
beginnings into the site of international controversy. The shrine 
was originally created in 1869, to commemorate government 
soldiers killed in the Boshin war, considered a civil war of 
independence between the Shogunate and Emperor Meiji, and it 
was renamed as the Yasukuni Shrine in 1879.1 It has grown into 
a symbol of Japanese nationalism, militarism, and historical 
revisionism, which is controversial to the pacifist culture in 
Japan and to China, Korea and Taiwan.2
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1. ISAO EBIHARA, SHINTO WAR GODS OF YASUKUNI SHRINE: THE 
GATES OF HADES AND JAPAN’S EMPEROR CULT 55-59 (2011).
2. Id.
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Many enshrined there today were involved in Japanese 
military expansionism and some committed war crimes.3 This 
includes fourteen Class-A war criminals who were secretly 
enshrined there without public knowledge.4 There are, of course, 
many enshrined there who did not commit war crimes, but the 
cultural meaning of the shrine is itself controversial to the 
victims, and the co-nationals and descendants of the victims, of 
atrocities carried out by the Japanese military before and during 
World War II.5 Thus, to many Koreans, Chinese, Taiwanese and 
others, as well as many Japanese, the shrine—and especially 
official visits to the shrine by the Prime Minister of Japan—is an 
offense to humanity and a celebration of war criminals.6
Japan is a constitutional democracy, however, and whether or 
not visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by the Prime Minister of Japan 
are offensive and ill advised, the question remains whether those 
visits are constitutional. Most courts that have considered the 
question have held the visits are constitutional, but at least one 
court, the Osaka High Court, has held the visits are 
unconstitutional.7 This essay argues that the Osaka High Court 
correctly interpreted the Japanese Constitution and that public—
as opposed to truly private—visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by 
Japanese government officials is unconstitutional when Articles 
20 and 89 of the Japanese Constitution, and relevant Japanese 
Supreme Court decisions, are considered. This essay also argues 
that virtually all visits by the Prime Minister to the Yasukuni 
Shrine are public visits for constitutional purposes, regardless of 
how they are characterized. Readers from outside Japan, 
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See generally YASUKUNI, THE WAR DEAD AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
JAPAN’S PAST (John Breen ed. 2010) (collection of essays, most of which 
address the connection between the Yasukuni Shrine and Japanese history and 
revisionism, as well as the tensions it creates for Japan with nations that were 
colonized and subject to war crimes during Japanese occupation).
6. See generally id.
7. JOHN BREEN & MARK TEEUWEN, A NEW HISTORY OF SHINTO 215-16
(2009).
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however, should be mindful of the fact that the value of legal 
precedent is different in Japan than in the United States.8
The focus of this essay is specifically on visits by the Prime 
Minister of Japan to the Yasukuni Shrine to pay homage to the 
Kami (spirits) enshrined there, but the analysis may be 
applicable to visits by other government officials. The analysis 
would also apply to visits by the Prime Minister and other 
government officials to other religious sites if those visits also 
have the religious elements that visits to the Yasukuni Shrine 
have. This article does not address the involuntary enshrinement
of the spirits of people, even when the government tacitly aided 
the shrine in gaining the information necessary to determine 
whom to enshrine. This issue, while exceptionally important, is 
well beyond the limited scope of this essay.
Part I of this essay will briefly set forth the history and 
cultural meaning of the Yasukuni Shrine and visits by the Prime 
Minister to the Shrine. Part II will discuss the current state of the 
law relating to Articles 20 and 89 of the Japanese Constitution, 
which address freedom of religion. Part III will look specifically 
at the legal implications of visits by the Prime Minister to the 
Yasukuni Shrine in light of the information discussed in Parts I 
and II, as well as court cases in Japan that have directly 
addressed the issue.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE YASUKUNI SHRINE AND 
RELATED CONTROVERSIES
As mentioned above the Yasukuni Shrine was founded in 
1869 to commemorate government soldiers killed in the Boshin 
war, a civil war of independence between the Shogunate and 
Emperor Meiji.9 The shrine was publically supported by the 
government, and was a major edifice of State Shinto, described 
below, until the end of World War II. Since then, it has been a 
private entity that does not receive financial support from the 
8. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
9. EBIHARA, supra note 1, at 55-59.
716 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22.3
government.10 It has been heavily supported by right-wing 
nationalist groups, and has become a symbol for those groups.11
The Yasukuni Shrine includes a war museum that glorifies 
Japanese military action and occupation through exhibits that 
tend to portray a revisionist history that overlooks the human 
rights violations committed by the Japanese military during the 
Meiji, Taisho and Showa eras,12 and depicts that military action 
as protecting Asia from western imperialism.13
The Yasukuni Shrine and its glorification of the Emperor and 
militarism—which is not supported by the current Emperor—has 
its roots in State Shinto. State Shinto involved worship, or public 
recognition of and fealty to, the Emperor and the imperial 
ancestors, who were said to have come from an unbroken line 
descended from the Amaterasu, the Goddess of the sun and 
universe in Shintoism.14 During the Meiji era State Shinto both 
came to prominence and was established as the state religion.15 It 
is important not confuse State Shinto with the longstanding 
tradition of Shintoism and modern Shinto. State Shinto was 
centered on the Emperor and his ancestors.16
State Shinto facilitated militancy and a sense of Japanese 
superiority.17 This mentality supported significant military 
campaigns, territorial occupation, and subjugation of other 
nations,18 culminating in Japanese involvement in World War 
II.19 After the war, the U.S. occupation government abolished 
State Shinto,20 and in 1946 the modern Japanese Constitution 
10. Id.
11. YASUKUNI, supra note 5, at 25-26.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 77.
14. NOBUSHIGE HOZUMI, ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND JAPANESE LAW 34-
47 (1912).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. HELEN HARDACRE, SHINTO AND THE STATE, 1868-1988 4 (1991).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 133.
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was promulgated.21 A significant focus of the new Japanese
Constitution was drastic limitation on the power of the Emperor 
and the prohibition of government support for religion, in order 
to prevent a return to State Shinto.22
The Yasukuni Shrine is viewed by many Japanese as a 
remnant of that period. It is also viewed that way by those 
nations affected by Japanese military action and occupation, 
especially China, Korea and Taiwan. This has been especially 
true since it was revealed that fourteen Class-A war criminals are 
enshrined there.23 Since that time neither Emperor Hirohito nor 
current Emperor Akahito have visited the shrine because Class A 
war criminals are enshrined there.24
Enshrining the spirits of the dead in Shinto Shrines as Kami, 
which can be understood as eternal spirits—although these 
Western terms do not exactly capture the idea—is not unique to 
the Yasukuni Shrine and is generally not controversial. In fact, 
many of those enshrined at the Yasukuni Shrine as Kami, 
especially those enshrined prior to the Japanese occupation of 
China, Taiwan, and Korea, would not be considered 
controversial.25 It is the enshrinement of war criminals, as well 
as the enshrinement of individuals who did not want to be 
enshrined there,26 including those who were forcefully 
conscripted into the Japanese military, that has raised 
controversy.27
21. N,+21.2.8.(13ƿ[.(13ƿ] [CONSTITUTION], (JAPAN).
22. Id. arts. 20 & 89.
23. BREEN & TEEUWEN, supra note 7, at 1-5; EBIHARA, supra note 1, at 
87-89.
24. Hirohito Quit Yasukuni Shrine Visits Over Concerns About War 
Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, (APR. 26, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/26
/world/asia/26iht-japan.1.5447598.html?_r=0.
25. Id.
26. Barry A. Fisher, Symposium, Yasukuni Shrine: Typhoon’s Eye of 
Japan’s Spiritual/ Political Storm Rejecting Wartime Victim Redress, DUKE U.
(Nov. 8, 2007) http://people.duke.edu/~myhan/kaf0704.pdf (some of these 
individuals were from Taiwan, Korea and China, and their families have sought 
unsuccessfully to have them unenshrined).
27. Id.
718 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22.3
The above-mentioned facts, and the connection between the 
Yasukuni Shrine and extreme nationalist groups, have made it a 
controversial place both within Japan and outside of Japan. Thus, 
visits by the Prime Minister of Japan to the shrine have been 
divisive. This essay does not address the political controversy as 
such, but rather asks the question whether official visits by the 
Prime Minister to pay homage and make offerings at what is 
clearly a religious venue is unconstitutional under Articles 20 
and 89 of the Japanese Constitution.28
I do not, however, question the right of the Yasukuni Shrine 
to exist as a private religious entity, the right of anyone—
including the Prime Minister—to visit the shrine as a private 
individual (without government support or public attention), or 
the right of nationalist groups to push their political agenda 
without government support. These rights are clearly protected 
by the Japanese Constitution. In fact, the same constitutional 
ideals that this essay suggests make official visits by the Prime 
Minister to the Yasukuni Shrine unconstitutional, support the 
right of the Shrine to exist and carry out its business as a private 
religious entity. 
II. SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENT AND RELIGION UNDER THE 
JAPANESE CONSTITUTION
This section focuses on cases decided by the Japanese 
Supreme Court that are of particular relevance to official visits 
by the Prime Minister to the Yasukuni Shrine. No case decided 
by the Japanese Supreme Court has directly addressed this issue; 
although a few lower court cases mentioned in Part IV directly 
address the issue. Thus, the cases addressed in this section set 
forth relevant legal concepts developed by the Japanese Supreme 
Court under Articles 20 and 89 of the Constitution of Japan, 
which govern what we in the United States refer to as the 
Establishment of Religion, and can be referred to in Japanese as 
28. Id.
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Seiji to Shuukyou no Bunri, or the Separation of government and 
religion. 
Article 20 of the Constitution of Japan reads:
1. Freedom of Religion is Guaranteed to all. No religious 
organization shall receive any privileges from the state, nor 
exercise any political authority. 2. No person shall be 
compelled to take part in any religious acts, celebration, right 
or practice. 3. The State and its organs shall refrain from 
religious education or any other religious activity. 29
Article 89 of the Constitution of Japan reads:
No public money or other property shall be expended or 
appropriated for the use, benefit or maintenance of any 
religious institution or association, or for any charitable, 
educational or benevolent enterprises not under the control of 
public authority.30
The language of these articles seems to create a strong barrier 
against government support for religion. Yet, as I have suggested 
elsewhere that barrier was rarely strong in decisions by the 
Japanese Supreme Court prior to 1997.31 In 1997, the Japanese 
Supreme Court held that a strong barrier between government 
and religion is consistent with the language and intent of Articles 
20 and 89. The Court explained that Articles 20 and 89 were 
clearly aimed at ending government support for State Shinto or 
any other religion.32 Prior to 1997, the Court did not view 
government interaction with Shinto as strictly subject to these 
strictures, but these earlier cases were more focused on 
29. NIHONKOKU KENPƿ[KENPƿ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 20 (Japan).
30. Id. art. 89.
31. Frank S. Ravitch, Symposium, The Shinto Shrine Cases, Religion, 
Culture, or Both: The Japanese Supreme Court and One Hundred Years of 
Establishment of Religion Cases, 2013 BYU L. Rev. 505, 509-12 (2014).
32. The Ehime Tamagushi Case, 6DLNǀSaibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 
1997, 1992 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 156. 51 S$,.ƿ SAIBANSHO MINJI H$15(,6+ǋ
[M,16+ǋ] 1673 (Japan).
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traditional or day to day Shinto, rather than the remnants of State 
Shinto. 
In 1997, the Japanese Supreme Court decided the Ehime 
Tamagushi case which involved the use of public funds by 
government officials from Ehime Prefecture.33 The funds were 
used for offerings given by government officials to the Yasukuni
Shrine and the Gokoku Shrine at ceremonies held by those 
shrines.34 The offerings were not expensive and consisted of 
twigs from the sakiki tree wrapped with folded white papers.35
This sort of offering is called “Tamagushi.”36 The offerings were 
paid for with government funds and given by representatives of 
the government at the behest Haruki Shiraishi, the then governor 
of Ehime Prefecture.37
The Ehime Tamagushi Court applied Article 20(3) and Article 
89 of the Constitution of Japan, and in doing so used a legal test 
similar to the one adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lemon 
v. Kurtzman,38 augmented by endorsement of religion analysis 
also similar to that used by the United States Supreme Court.39
The test is as follows, “taking the purposes and effects of the 
given conduct into consideration, it [the principle of separation 
of government and religion as applied by the court] should be 
interpreted as prohibiting” state conduct that is “beyond the 
appropriate limits in light of the social and cultural 
circumstances of our country.”40
Further elaborating on this test the Court wrote:
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. HOZUMI, supra note 14, at 59.
37. The Ehime Tamagushi Case, 6DLNǀSaibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2,
1997, 1992 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 156. 51 S$,.ƿ SAIBANSHO MINJI H$15(,6+ǋ
[M,16+ǋ] 1673 (Japan).
38. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
39. See generally McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 
(2005).
40. 7KH (KLPH 7DPDJXVKL &DVH 6DLNǀ6DLEDQVKR [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 
1997, 1992 (Gyo-7VXQR6DLNǀ6DLEDQVKR0LQML+DQUHLVKǌ>0LQVKǌ@
1673 (Japan).
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According to [the] significance of the principle of separation 
of state and religion, ‘religious activity’ in Article 20(3) 
should not be interpreted as prohibiting all religious activities 
that the state or state authority might be involved in. Rather, 
only the activities exceeding such reasonable limits, the 
purpose of which have some religious meaning and the effect 
of which is to support, promote, or, adversely, oppose or 
interfere with religion, should be prohibited. And in 
determining whether a given religious act constitutes a 
prohibited ‘religious activity’ or not, not only the external 
aspects of the conduct but also the place of the conduct, the 
average person’s religious understanding toward the conduct, 
the existence or extent of actor’s religious intention, purpose, 
or awareness in holding the ceremony, and the effect or 
influence on the average person should be considered as 
factors. And at that time, objective judgment based on socially 
accepted ideas is necessary.41
As will be seen in Part IV, these factors taken as a whole do 
not favor the constitutionality of visits by the Prime Minister of 
Japan to the Yasukuni Shrine.
Significantly, the Court explicitly stated that one of the major 
reasons underlying Articles 20 and 89 was the abolishment of 
State Shinto.42 The Court condemned Meiji era practices and 
held that, “the Constitution should be interpreted as striving for a 
secular and religiously neutral state by regarding the total 
separation of state and religion as its ideal.”43 The Court held this 
approach helps protect the freedom of religion.44
The Court recognized, however, that total separation between 
church and state is impossible, because anytime government 
regulates social norms it can affect religion indirectly.45 The 
purpose and effects test, considering whether the government 
action under review favors religion in the eyes of the public, 
allows the courts and government officials to determine whether 
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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a given action or actions exceeds the permissible boundaries 
under Article 20(3) and Article 89.46 Applying this analysis, the 
Court held that paying for and giving the Tamagushi offerings at 
the Yasukuni and Gokoku Shrines violated both the purpose and 
effect elements of the test and endorsed religion in the eyes of 
the public.47
Government officials offering tamagushi (and kumoturyo, 
another kind of offering), in the name of the local government, 
directly supports the religious activity of the shrine.48 The Court 
noted that other sorts of gifts, so long as they are given to the 
family of the war dead rather than the shrine, could be given 
because such gifts are not given to support religious activity.49
The Court also noted that government officials may give saisen 
from their own pockets.50 Saisen is an anonymous gift given 
when people visit temples or shrines.51 Shiraishi was ordered to 
repay the government for all the expenditures made in support of 
the offerings.52
The Ehime Tamagushi case was a significant event in 
constitutional analysis of Articles 20 and 89 of the Constitution 
of Japan.53 Earlier cases applied similar legal tests, but without 
the historical and jurisprudential context applied by the Ehime 
Tamagushi Court.54 Most notable among these earlier cases is 
the Tsu City Groundbreaking Ceremony case.55
The facts of that case are significantly different from those in 
the Ehime Tamagushi case. In Tsu City, Shinto rites were 
performed at a city-sponsored groundbreaking for a municipal 
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Ravitch, supra note 31, at 513-19.
54. Id.
55. 31 SAIKOU SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHUU [MINSHUU] No. 69 
(Grand Bench) (1977).
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gym.56 The ceremony and offerings were paid for by the city.57
The Japanese Supreme Court applied the purpose and effects test 
later used by the Ehime Tamagushi Court, and held state 
connection with religion that, when considering Japanese social
and cultural conditions and the purpose and effect of the state 
action, exceeds a reasonable standard consonant with the 
objective of religious freedom, is unconstitutional.58 A violation 
of Art. 20, Paragraph 3 occurs when government conduct has a 
purpose with religious significance or the effect of the 
government conduct is to subsidize, promote, suppress, or 
interfere with religion.59
The groundbreaking rites were obviously connected to 
religion,60 but they were not unconstitutional when considering 
the totality of the circumstances, because the ceremony had the 
secular purpose of “marking the start of construction by a rite 
performed in accordance with general social custom to pray for a 
stable foundation for the building and accident-free construction 
work.”61 The effects of the ceremony did not subsidize or 
promote Shinto, suppress or interfere with other religions, 
according to the Court.62 The Court basically held that the 
groundbreaking ceremony was just a local cultural custom that 
did little to promote religion.63
I have argued elsewhere that the analysis in this case is 
inconsistent with the legal test it sets forth and the language of 
Article 20(3) and Article 89.64 For present purposes, however, 
Tsu City helps us understand why a visit by the Prime Minister to 
the Yasukuni Shrine, unlike local groundbreaking ceremonies, is 
56. Tsu City Ground-%UHDNLQJ&HUHPRQ\&DVH1DJR\D'DLKǀWHL>6XS
Ct.] Aug. 13, 1977, 1971 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 69, 31 Saikou Saibansho Minji 
+DQUHLVKXX>0LQVKǌ@-DSDQ
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Ravitch, supra note 31, at 509-13.
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not just a cultural norm that does little to promote Shinto, but 
rather constitutes a nationally and internationally recognized 
engagement by the Prime Minister with one Shinto sect. In fact, 
the focus on the traditional nature and general acceptance of 
local Shinto groundbreaking ceremonies in Tsu City can be 
easily contrasted with the controversial nature of offerings by 
government officials at the Yasukuni Shrine---which has a 
connection to State Shinto---in Ehime Tamagushi.65
III. WHAT DOES ALL THIS MEAN FOR OFFICIAL VISITS BY THE 
PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN TO THE YASUKUNI SHRINE?
A number of lower courts have directly addressed visits by 
the Prime Minister to the Yasukuni Shrine, and most have held 
that it is constitutional, but they have done so in a number of 
cases by distorting the facts and suggesting that the visits were 
private, even where major national attention was called to the 
visits and where the Prime Minister used official vehicles, etc . . . 
during the visit. One court, the Osaka High Court, however, held 
these visits to be unconstitutional and recognized that a 
publically acknowledged visit by the leader of the nation to the 
Yasukuni Shrine is imbued with religious meaning in the minds 
of the public and may have a religious effect (and as a practical 
matter a religious purpose). 
The argument most often made to support the 
constitutionality of these visits is that they are made in the 
government official’s private capacity. This suggests that the 
visits are not state action and therefore cannot be a violation of 
the Constitution. When people visit the shrine there is a guest 
book that is signed. This has been an important focus in visits by 
government officials. Do they sign the book as a private citizen, 
65. Compare Tsu City (finding local Shinto groundbreaking ceremony 
a generally accepted, normal part of Japanese culture) with Ekime Tamagushi
(finding offerings by government officials at the Yasukuni Shrine to be 
unconstitutional and noting connection between Yasukuni and State Shinto as 
well as the lack of general acceptability or normalcy in Japanese society for 
such offerings by government officials).
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under their government title, both, or do they simply not sign the 
book at all? 
Yet, under Articles 20(3) and 89, it does not matter whether 
the Prime Minister states the visit is in his private or public 
capacity. The visits are unconstitutional regardless. The Ehime 
Tamagushi and Tsu City cases both look at the “totality of the 
circumstances” when evaluating the constitutionality of 
government action.66 When a Prime Minister visits the Yasukuni 
Shrine, even in an allegedly private capacity, many factors must 
be considered in determining if there is state action and whether 
that state action is unconstitutional. First, and foremost is the fact 
that these visits are generally public and attract the attention of 
the media. In fact, this is often the intent of the Prime Minister or 
official visiting the Shrine. 
Moreover, there is no question that the Yasukuni Shrine is a 
religious entity, and in fact, a religious entity with a direct 
theological and historical relationship to State Shinto. Prime 
Ministers generally make offerings at the shrine and have visited 
the shrine during festivals held at the shrine. Many people in 
Japan and throughout Asia pay attention to whether a given 
Prime Minister visits the Shrine. These visits are in no real sense 
private, especially considering the factors set forth in the Ehime 
Tamagushi case.
If one wanted to be cynical, one could argue that these visits 
serve no religious intent, but rather are a form of political 
pandering. Yet, many government officials who visit the Shrine 
reject this argument. Moreover, favoring one religion in order to 
pander to constituents is no more constitutional than favoring a 
specific religion for purely religious purposes. Let’s consider the 
factors set forth by the Japanese Supreme Court for analyzing 
cases under Articles 20(3) and 89: 
66. 7KH (KLPH 7DPDJXVKL &DVH 6DLNǀ 6DLEDQVKR >6XS &W@ $SU 
1997, 1992 (Gyo-7VXQR6DLNǀ6DLEDQVKR0LQML+DQUHLVKǌ>0LQVKǌ@
1673 (Japan); Tsu City Ground-%UHDNLQJ &HUHPRQ\ &DVH 1DJR\D 'DLKǀWHL
[Sup. Ct.] Aug. 13, 1977, 1971 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 69, 31 Saikou Saibansho Minji 
+DQUHLVKXX>0LQVKǌ@-DSDQ
726 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22.3
1. “The external aspects of the conduct”—As noted above the 
conduct involves the leader of the nation visiting a religious 
shrine to make offerings under intense media scrutiny.
2. “The place of the conduct”—The Yasukuni Shrine, which is 
clearly a religious site and which has a direct connection to 
State Shinto, and Articles 20(3) and 89 were designed to limit 
State Shinto.
3. “The average person’s religious understanding toward the 
conduct”—The average person knows that the Shrine is a 
religious venue where the souls of Japanese war casualties are 
enshrined. The average person would also be aware that war 
criminals are enshrined there given the massive media 
attention paid to this issue and the international condemnation 
such visits engender. 
4. “The existence or extent of actor’s religious intention, 
purpose, or awareness”—There are really only two 
possibilities here. The Prime Minister genuinely intends to 
visit the shrine for religious purposes or the Prime Minister is 
using the visit to pander to particular political interests (in 
which case he is using a religious means to achieve a secular 
end). 
5. “The effect or influence on the average person”—The 
average person can perceive these visits as supporting the 
Shrine, the souls of the dead there, and also Japanese 
nationalism. The last of these perceptions is not 
constitutionally problematic because it is not based in religion, 
but the first two are. 
6. “Objective judgment based on socially accepted ideas”—
The controversy surrounding these visits within Japan (for this 
element the controversy outside Japan is not relevant) 
demonstrates that these visits are not socially accepted in the 
way a Shinto right at a local groundbreaking ceremony would 
be. There is no broad public consensus or sense within Japan 
that these visits are socially acceptable. To use the language of 
the United States Supreme Court, these visits create political 
insiders and outsiders along religious lines (or in this case 
based on religious acts) and a reasonable member of the public 
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would view the visits as endorsing the Yasukuni Shrine and its 
religious, as well as religio-political, agenda.67
Thus, given all these factors, a strong argument can be made 
that these visits, considering their purpose and effects in light of 
the principle of the separation of government and religion, are 
state conduct “beyond the appropriate limits in light of the social 
and cultural circumstances of” Japan.68 Whether the Prime 
Minister formally characterizes the visits as public or private is 
irrelevant so long as the visit is publically recognized.
An important question that must be addressed is the Prime 
Minister’s right to free exercise of religion under Article 20(1).69
An argument can be made that prohibiting government officials 
from visiting a Shrine they may want to visit for personal 
religious reasons, and maybe because they have relatives 
enshrined there, would be a significant infringement on the 
official’s freedom of religion. This is a good argument, but the 
concern can be answered with little trouble.
The most obvious argument to be made here is that 
government officials must follow the Constitution even when it 
conflicts with rights they may have if they did not hold public 
office. But here even this argument is unnecessary. There would 
be no problem with a Prime Minister visiting the Shrine in a 
truly private capacity, meaning no public announcement of the 
visit, no leaks to the media, no use of government vehicles or 
government seals or paraphernalia, any offerings being paid for 
and made privately, and no endorsement of, support for, or 
announcement by, any government official or staff member.
67. See generally Santa Fe Ind. School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 
(2000); see also McCreary, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
68. 7KH (KLPH 7DPDJXVKL &DVH 6DLNǀ 6DLEDQVKR >6XS &W@ $SU 
1997, 1992 (Gyo-7VXQR6DLNǀ6DLEDQVKR0LQML+DQUHLVKǌ>0LQVKǌ@
1673 (Japan).
69. For a discussion of Free Exercise of religion under the Japanese 
Constitution, see Frank S. Ravitch, Symposium, The Unbearable Lightness of 
Free Exercise Under Smith: Exemptions, Dasein, and the More Nuanced 
Approach of the Japanese Supreme Court, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 259, 274-79
(2011).
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Given, however, the need for security it would seem 
acceptable and consonant with Articles 20 and 89 for the Prime 
Minister to have the necessary security staff there. If the media 
somehow found out about the visit through no fault of the 
government (leaks would be the fault of government), there 
would be no violation. If the Shrine or a group that is connected, 
even indirectly to the shrine, were to announce the visit, it may 
lead to a situation where it would be impossible for the Prime 
Minister to make such visits while in office without violating 
Articles 20(3) and 89 in light of the factors set forth in the Ehime 
Tamagushi case. 
The distinction drawn between public and private visits in 
some of the lower court cases, a distinction also made by Prime 
Ministers who have visited and their staffs, is inconsistent with 
the factors and legal tests the Japanese Supreme Court has 
developed under Article 20(3) and 89. The fact that the Yasukuni 
Shrine is a holdover from the Meiji era and State Shinto should 
make analysis of visits there even more strict. In fact, the Ehime 
Tamagushi Court addressed the historical reasons for Articles 20 
and 89 going back to the problems created by State Shinto 
during the Meiji, Taisho and early Showa eras.70 However, even 
under a basic analysis of the factors used in separation of 
government and religion cases in the Japanese Supreme Court, 
the visits are unconstitutional.
For non-Japanese reading this essay, it is important to note 
that the Ehime Tamagushi and Tsu City decisions do not have the 
same binding force as decisions made by the United States 
Supreme Court on constitutional questions.71 In Japan, the 
concept of precedent is different than in the United States.72 Yet, 
70. 7KH (KLPH 7DPDJXVKL &DVH 6DLNǀ 6DLEDQVKR >6XS &W@ $SU 
1997, 1992 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 156, 51 S$,.ƿ SAIBANSHO MINJI H$15(,6+ǋ
[MINS+ǋ] 1673 (Japan).
71. Shigenori Matsui, Constitutional Precedents in Japan: A Comment 
on the Role of Precedent, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1669, 1671-77 (2011).
72. Id.
2014] The Japanese PM's Visits to the Yasukuni Shrine 729
both the Tsu City and Ehime Tamagushi cases were followed by 
subsequent Courts (and lower courts).73
CONCLUSION
Public visits by the Prime Minister of Japan, and by 
implication other high ranking government officials, are 
unconstitutional under Articles 20(3) and 89 of the Japanese 
Constitution. These visits violate every factor set forth by the 
Japanese Supreme Court for analyzing cases under Articles 20(3) 
and 89. Whether these visits are ostensibly in a private or public 
capacity should be irrelevant to the analysis given these factors. 
The real question should be whether the visits are publically 
recognized, and to this question, no formalistic distinction 
between public and private visits makes sense. Truly private 
visits, without significant public attention, are protected by 
Article 20(1), but visits by the Prime Minister rarely if ever fall 
into that category because of the public attention they—often 
intentionally—garner. So long as these visits are announced and 
covered by the media they are unconstitutional. 
73. Ravitch, supra note 31, at 515-18.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
